

Politics, Economics and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

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Source: Lt. John F. Bradford, U.S. Navy. "The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia," Naval War College Review, Summer 2005.



- Maritime Security \neq Maritime CT
- Maritime Security: piracy, terrorism, jurisdictional/territorial issues, trafficking, poaching, marine environmental protection, etc.
- Policy ‘position’ varies across nations...

Politics, Economics and Maritime security

Indonesia	Malaysia	Singapore	Thailand	Philippines
Devolution of central power; economic instability; Territorial threats (separatist); Terrorism	Political balance; rels. with Thailand; territorial; Sovereignty; illegal immigration , environmental	Politico-eco. Stability; WMD Transshipment; geographica l exposure	Pattani (Insurgency, South); human trafficking; Transshipment	Politico-eco. crisis; Growth of Communist movement; Mindanao; Piracy
US/PRC /India /Japan rels.				
Archipelago, longest coastline; littoral; 1.8 mil km²	Littoral	Smallest, littoral *700km²		Archipelago, #2 longest c.
Needs fleet modernizati on most	No. 2 most sophisticate d	Most sophisticate d naval		Also weakest naval

- Other considerations:
 - Organization/infrastructure
 - Intra-ASEAN relations
 - Territorial disputes: Indonesia-Malaysia; Malaysia-Thailand; Singapore-Malaysia; Philippines-Malaysia-Vietnam-PRC-Brunei in Spratleys
 - Changing face of Asia's drug trade
 - Commitment to Maritime security initiatives, schemes: CSI, PSI, International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Intl. Port Security Program, C-TPAT, etc.

Source: Shie, Tamara Renee. “The Nexus Between Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation, and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia.” Pacific Forum CSIS, July 2004: Issues & Insights, Vol. 4, No. 4: 25.

Acceptance of Maritime Security Conventions and Initiatives by ASEAN Members

	UNCLOS	IMO	SOLAS	SUA	PSI	CSI	ISPS
Brunei	X	X	X	X			
Cambodia		X	X				
Indonesia	X	X	X				X
Laos	X						
Malaysia	X	X	X			X	X
Myanmar	X	X	X	X			
Philippines	X	X	X	X			X
Singapore	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Thailand		X	X			X	X
Vietnam	X	X	X	X			X

Note: As of May 2004. ISPS as of September 2003.

Sources: IMO website, Yann-huei Song, “Maritime Security and International Maritime Instruments,” *Indonesian Quarterly* 31, 4 (2003), p. 480.

Source: Dr. Scott A. Jones. Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional Response. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: October 2004: 11.

	Goods	Technology
	Arms, Nuclear/ BCW Missile	Dual-use items
	Related item	
Brunei	Yes	Yes
Cambodia	Yes	Partial
China	Yes	Partial
Hong Kong, China	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	Partial	Partial
Japan	Yes	Yes
Korea	Yes	Yes
Laos	Partial	Partial
Macau, China	Yes	Yes
Malaysia	Partial	Partial
Mongolia	Partial	Partial
Myanmar	Yes	Partial
Philippines	Partial	No
Singapore	Partial	Partial
Chinese Taipei	Yes	Partial
Thailand	Yes	Partial
Viet Nam	Yes	Partial


- More considerations
 - How much of ‘at-sea’ concerns are land-based? (resource allocation implications)
 - How intense are intra-government rivalries? (resources, leadership role, etc.)
 - Political & economic role of local Chinese communities?
 - Nature of G2B, B2B coordination & participation

- Littoral or user state?
 - Energy / oil flow
 - Economic
 - Counter-terrorism
 - Geo-strategic considerations

- Technological issues:
 - Disparity/Diversity
 - Developing maritime capability of TN actors (traffickers, terrorists, etc. + tactical alliances)
 - Interoperability & naval modernization
 - Singapore – submarines (Sweden)
 - Indonesia – vessels (Dutch), Subs (South Korea)
 - Thailand – aircraft (Indonesia)
 - Philippines – surveillance aircraft, vessels (US)
 - Myanmar, Vietnam, Brunei - ???

- Technological....(cont'd).
 - To share or not to share, or how much to share?
- Institutional/Systems coordination both intra- and inter-

Source: Willis, Henry and David Ortiz. Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain. Rand Corporation: 2004: x.



FTC = Federal Trade Commission; CBP = U.S. Customs and Border Protection; USCG = U.S. Coast Guard; IMO = International Maritime Organization; WCO = World Customs Organization; NVOCC = Non-vessel Operating Common Carrier

Organizational Interests. (Willis & Ortiz, p. x).

Table 5.1


Organizational Interests. The three layers may be specified by the organizations that comprise each layer. Note that oversight agencies have a limited range of influence over organizations in either the transaction or logistics layer.

Layer	Examples of Stakeholders	Examples of Oversight Agencies
Transaction	Wal-Mart Target Ford Non-Vessel-Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs)	Federal Trade Commission U.S. Customs and Border Protection World Customs Organization
Logistics layer	International Longshore and Warehouse Union Pacific Maritime Association International Labor Organization CSX Transportation APL Maersk Sealand Port of Long Beach	U.S. Department of Labor U.S. Department of Homeland Security Local law enforcement U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Customs and Border Protection World Customs Organization

Organizational Interests. (Willis & Ortiz, p. 11).

Figure 2

The Logistics Layer in Terms of the Systems and People that Move Cargo. This figure combines two figures from OECD (2003), illustrating the movement of cargo in terms of the persons who have access to it (single-lined boxes) and by the places to which it travels (double-lined boxes and arrows). Actions to secure the supply chain follow these figures by limiting the access of people to the cargo or by securing the routes and conveyances on which it travels.




RAND TR214-2

SOURCE: OECD, "Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact," Maritime Transport Committee report, 2003. Online at <http://www.oecd.org/> (as of November 5, 2003). Adapted and used with permission.

The Business Transaction Network (Willis & Ortiz, p. 9)

seller's bank, the import bank and the buyer for a bill of exchange for goods.




RAND TR214-I

SOURCE: OECD, "Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact," Maritime Transport Committee report, 2003. Online at <http://www.oecd.org/home/> (as of November 5, 2003). Adapted and used with permission.

Global Container Security: 3 Essential Components Are Required


- **Intelligence** (hard and soft intelligence, private and government – US and foreign – sources)
- **Shipment Profile and Information** (financing, manufacturer, consolidator, shipper, consignee, legal and business terms)
- **Container Tracking and Security** (from point of loading, origin, origin load port to port of discharge and final delivery)

= **Holistic View of Global Supply Chain (down to each container)**



Cracking a Case

A dirty bomb is set to go off in Times Square on New Year's Eve. Plotters leave clues scattered around the world.




Parting Comments

- Conceptions of 'Security'
- Conceptions of 'Maritime Security'
- Managing a problem, i.e. Malacca Straits security, but not resolving the root causes? (MJ Nam, ISEAS 5/2004 conf.)
- Rule of Law
 - Level of confidence across region
 - Diversity in legal tradition

- The more globalized, the more exposed to vulnerabilities
- Context matters: multi-level, multi-cultural, multi-institutional, work across all types of boundaries

Stake	Interests	Chokepoints	Consequences	+	-	Rank/ Criteria
Holders						
Politicians						Stability
Military						Protection of interests
Public						Accessibility
ASEAN						Cost
Business						Lives saved
US, PRC, etc						Regional politics
						Identity politics
						Religion
						Power Projection



The diagram illustrates the central role of 'G' (likely representing a geopolitical entity) in driving various outcomes. Arrows point from 'G' to a list of eight consequences: Security, Politics, Economic, Social, Legal, S&T devt, Culture, and Military.

Questions?